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The paper examines the ﬁnancial crises of the 1990s. They represent a
new kind of crises, as they do not seem to conform to the so-called
ﬁrst generation and second generation literature on currency crises.
The outburst of the Asian crises brought a new challenge for economic
policy. The attention has been placed on the self-fulﬁlling character of
the speculative attacks and microeconomic weaknesses. The ﬁrst part
of the paper reviews the recent theoretical literature on ﬁnancial crises,
the second part addresses some lessons for emerging economies. The
authors consider the policies to manage ﬁnancial crises and reduce the
risks associated with them.
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Introduction
Over the past decades, the total capital ﬂows to emerging economies
have increased tremendously and most of the increase was in equities
and portfolio investments. However, as international capital movements
have been the main catalyst for the accelerating global economic integra-
tion,marketfailuresassociatedwiththemhavealsobecomemorevisible.
Since 1982 emerging markets have been rocked by three major ﬁnancial
crises: the American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican crisis of 1994–
1995 and the Asian crisis 1997. The Asian crisis spread to Russia and Latin
America and impacted the economies of many industrialized nations as
well.
Financial crises in emerging economies are very diﬀerent today than
they were in the past. Between 1940 and the 1970s, ﬁnancial crises in-
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volved large ﬁscal deﬁcits, repressed domestic ﬁnancial systems, and bal-
ance of payments situations that were associated with a sharp worsening
of terms of trade. In the late 1990s, however, a ‘new variety’ of crisis has
evolved in Asia. Many of the emerging economies that have experienced
ﬁnancial trauma have been considered very successful until the crises ex-
plode.
This paper aims to analyze the determinants of currency and ﬁnan-
cial crises in the aftermath of the Asian 1997 experience. In the literature
the commonly identiﬁed factors that increase vulnerability to the cur-
rency and ﬁnancial crises have been imprudent ﬁscal policies, fragilities
of the ﬁnancial sector, inadequacy of prudential supervision and regula-
tion, appreciated realexchangerate,aheavylending toprivate sectorand
low levels of foreign reserves in proportion to government’s liabilities as
measured by broad money. There is a general consensus that all crises
of the 1990s involved two kinds of market failures, namely, ﬁrst, inter-
national ﬁnancial institutions over-lent to emerging market economies
and, second, governments’ ﬁnancial institutions or corporations over-
borrowed.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes ﬁnan-
cial crises and recent theoretical developments. Section three addresses
some lessons from the recent crises for emerging economies. The ﬁnal
sections discuss the ﬁndings and conclude.
FinancialCrisesandRecent Theoretical Developments
Serious ﬁnancial crises are not a new phenomenon; the Asian crisis fol-
lows on the tracks of Mexico 1994, the European Monetary System 1992–
1993, and previous crises in Latin America. These currency crises have
been the subject of extensive economic literature, both theoretical and
empirical. The theoretical literature on balance-of-payment crises has
ﬂourished following Krugman’s (1979) seminal paper. Krugman argued
that crises occur when a continuous deterioration in the economic fun-
damentals becomesinconsistentwithanattempttoﬁxtheexchangerate.
Krugman’s canonical model therefore explains crises as the result of fun-
damental inconsistency between domestic polices – typically the persis-
tence of money-ﬁnanced budget deﬁcit – and the attempt to maintain a
ﬁxed exchange rate. The inconsistency can be temporarily papered over
if the central bank has suﬃciently large reserves, but when these reserves
become inadequate speculators force the issue with a wane of selling.
The timing of the attack in Krugman’s model is therefore determined by
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a critical level in the amount of reserves. Once the reserves have been
lost in the attack, the central bank has no choice but to abandon the
peg. Crises thus result in a transition to ﬂoating. More recently, however,
some papers have argued that the authorities may decide to abandon the
parity for other reasons: theymaybeconcerned abouttheadverseconse-
quences of policy needed to maintain the parity (such as higher interest
rate) or other key economic variables (such as the level of employment).
The Krugman model and its extensions represent what has become
known as ﬁrst-generation models of balance-of-payment crises. Since
crisis arises as a result of an inconsistency between an excessive public
sector deﬁcit that becomes monetized and the exchange rate system, a
crisis is bothunavoidable and predictable in an economy with a constant
deterioration of its fundamentals.
Recent models have shown that a crisis may develop without a signiﬁ-
cant change in the fundamentals. Models built along this line are known
as second-generation models of balance-of-payment crises. There are at
least two types of these models, where crises are not aﬀected by the po-
sition of the fundamentals, but instead, they may simply occur as a con-
sequence of pure speculation against the currency. Calvo and Mendoza
(1997)developed themodelofherdingbehaviour;themodelstressesthat
information costs may lead foreign investors to take decisions based on
limited information and therefore to be more sensitive to rumours.
A second type of models stresses the possibility of contagion eﬀects.
Thereareagaintwotypes;theﬁrsttype(GerlachandSmets1995)focuses
on trade and on the loss of competitiveness associated with devaluation
b yam a i nt r a d i n gp a r t n e r ,w h i c hi nt u r nl e a v e st h ed o m e s t i cc u r r e n c y
more vulnerable to attack. The model presents a situation in which the
devaluation by one country leads its trading partners to devalue in or-
der to avoid a loss of competitiveness. The same eﬀect could be derived
in a model with multiple equilibria, in which the devaluation by a trade
partner serves to coordinate a worsening of expectations about the do-
mestic economy and generate a self-fulﬁlling attack. If contagion eﬀects
are present, a crisis in a neighbouring country may be an indicator of
a future domestic crisis. Masson (1998) developed a second type, which
is related to multiple equilibria, suggesting that a crisis in one country
may raise the odds of a crisis elsewhere by signalling that a devaluation
is more likely as a result of the initial crisis. The signal may then lead to
a self-fulﬁlling speculative attack.
One may conclude that many of the second-generation models im-
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plicitly or explicitly accept the possibility of self-fulﬁlling crisis. Esquivel
and Larrain (1998) deﬁne this type of crises as crises that occur when
the sheer pessimism of a signiﬁcant group of investors provokes a capital
outﬂow that leads to the eventual collapse of the exchange rate system,
thus validating the negative expectations. These recent theoretical devel-
opments accorda smaller role to fundamentals in generating balance-of-
payment crises, but they also have highlighted the importance that other
variables may have in helping to predict those crises.
The diﬃculties in accounting for some key aspects of more recent
crises have led some economists (Krugman 1998) to emphasize the need
for a ‘third generation’ crises model, centring around banking system
problems associated with moral hazard.
Lessonsfrom theInternationalFinancialCrisesof the 1990’s
Two major approaches dominated in the post-1997 theoretical literature.
The ﬁrst one, represented by McKinnon and Pill (1998)a sw e l la sK r u g -
man (1998; 1999) modelled the ‘over-borrowing syndrome’, and empha-
sized the role of moral-hazard-driven lending by unregulated banks and
ﬁnancial institutions (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1998). According to
this view, a rational agent can expect the government rescue operation
of any large bank or corporation with good political connections in case
it had solvency problem.
Radelet andSachs(1998)blamedacombinationof asetoffactorssuch
as panic in the international investment community, policy mistakes in
crisis management, and poorly designed international rescue programs,
for triggering a fully ﬂedged ﬁnancial panic resulting in currency crises,
bank runs, massive bankruptcies, and political disorder. Chang and Ve-
lasco (1998) have proposed similar approach, i.e. explaining the Asian
currency crisis as a product of a bank run. The ﬁrst theory of herding
(Chari and Kehoe 1997) underlines that a bandwagon eﬀect is driven by
an assumption that some investors have private information.
Building on this discussion, Krugman (1999)e l a b o r a t e dat h i r d -
generation model concentrating on microeconomic weaknesses (such as
moral hazard and resulting over-borrowing), which may trigger, in the
world of highcapital mobility, speculative attacks against the existing ex-
change rate regimes. This model attempts to consider both fundamental
factors and multiply equilibria in the market behaviour.
Financial crises of the kind experienced in East Asia have highlighted
the fact that in a globalizing environment policy mistakes can have more
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abrupt and profound consequences for the country involved than has
been the case in the past. The Asian crisis and the wave of currency crises
in Latin America had signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects outside the regions, and
especiallytransitioneconomieshavebeennegativelyaﬀectedbydevelop-
ments in Asia and Russia. What can the Asian and Russian experiences
tell us about how a small emerging economy might avoid such crisis in
its own economy?
The issue that arises in connection with crisis is to determine what
policy implication the currency crisis holds. The problems experienced
by the emerging countries diﬀer from each other, but there are certain
weaknesses that should be addressed for the small open emerging econ-
omy to reduce the chance of a recurrence. Let us single out some lessons
on key areas, many of which are interrelated:
lesson1: Financial Market Liberalization is the Best Predictor
of Currency Crises
This fact has been realised in Latin America in the 1980s, in Europe in
the early 1990s and again in Asia in 1997. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)
found that banking crises were rare during the 1970s, with only 3 taking
place(incontrasttoatotalof26balance-of-paymentcrises).Theabsence
of bankingcrisismayreﬂectthehighlyregulated natureof ﬁnancial mar-
kets during this period. While the number of balance-of-payment crises
per year does not increase much during the 1980s and 1990s( f r o m2.9 to
3.1), the number of banking crises per year more than quadruples in the
post-liberalizationperiod.Empiricalstudiessuggestthatdomesticﬁnan-
cial market deregulation leads to boom-and-bust cycles. The wave of lib-
eralization that started in the mid-1980s had two major eﬀects (Wyplosz
1998): making self-fulﬁlling attacks possible and installing weaknesses in
domestic ﬁnancial markets.
Twoproblemsareexacerbated whenthedomesticﬁnancialmarketbe-
comes international. The asymmetry of information widens when the
lender and the borrower belong to two very diﬀerent economies. The
result is that risk and volatility associated with ﬁnancial operations are
higher in global markets than in domestic ﬁnancial markets.
The second channel through which volatility in ﬁnancial markets is
widened when they become international is through the increased use
of derivatives (options and futures). Although the main target of such
a market was to reduce risk (mainly exchange rate risk) in ﬁnancial or
trade operations, theuseofthesekinds ofproductsquickly becamespec-
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ulative, leading to higher volatility through a wider asymmetry of infor-
mation.
The third mechanism through which risk increases volatility in global
ﬁnancial markets is through the role played by institutional investors
(hedge funds, pension funds, mutual fund, insurance companies ...).
Somebig institutional investors displayhighlyleveraged operations (Das
1998; Reisen 1999). Leveraged operations are highly risky, adding higher
volatility to the ﬁnancial system.
The message is clear: ﬁnancial market liberalization must be preceded
by a number of measures (eﬀective prudential regulation and supervi-
sion of banks, implementation of market-based instruments such as re-
serve requirements on foreign currency deposits and short term borrow-
ing, etc.). Deregulation must follow, not precede the strengthening of
the banking and ﬁnancial sectors. This factor has been admitted also by
the International Monetary Fund (imf 1998). The events in East Asia
havedemonstrated thatthepartialﬁnancial reformscouldledtoincreas-
ingly fragile ﬁnancial systems characterized by growing short-term for-
eign debt, rapidly expanding bank credit, and inadequate regulation and
supervision of ﬁnancial institutions. Such weaknesses leave the economy
vulnerable to rapid reversal of capital ﬂows.
lesson2: Increased Globalisation Raises the Contagion Eﬀects
The last two decades have been characterized by signiﬁcant and funda-
mental changes, which have challenged the capacities of economies to
adapt. Widespread lowering of national and regional barriers to trade
and foreign direct investment has led to closer links between economies.
Increased integration of markets across countries has acted as a major
stimulus to trade between developed and transition countries on the one
hand, but also as a potential channel of contagion on the other hand
(Strasek and Jagric 2002).
The contagion eﬀects are the contribution of the second-generation
models. Masson (1998) argues that contagion reﬂects a situation where
a crisis in one country may trigger a crisis elsewhere for reasons unex-
plained by macroeconomic fundamentals. Contagion is therefore an ad-
ditional eﬀect above and beyond those of domestic fundamentals. The
rising importance of contagion is striking: some studies (Schmukler and
Frankel 1996) suggest that investors diﬀerentiated among countries to a
greater extent after the 1994M e x i c a nc ri si st h a na f t e ri t s1982predecessor.
Mason (1998) also points out that the notion of contagion is not really
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well deﬁned, since assigning explanatory power to ‘contagion’ could be
regarded as a measure of our ignorance. A possible way of avoiding con-
fusion is to distinguish between various reasons. The factors that help
to explain why currency crises tend to be clustered fall into several cate-
gories:
￿ Monsoonal eﬀects, deﬁned as major economic shifts in industrial
countries that trigger crises in emerging markets. In this case, crises
may be due to common shocks, for instance polices undertaken by
industrial countries (a steep rise in world interest rates, a sharp
slowdown in world aggregate demand, a decline in commodity
prices, large changes in exchange rates between major currencies)
which have similar eﬀects on emerging markets.
￿ Spill-over eﬀects, d e ﬁ n e da sac a s ew h e r eac r i s i si no n ee m e r g -
ing market may aﬀect the macroeconomic fundamentals in other
emerging markets. Spillovers result from independence among de-
veloping countries themselves. Typical examples: a devaluation in
one emerging country reduces the price competitiveness of the
emerging counties, or because lack of liquidity in one market
leads ﬁnancial intermediaries to liquidate another emerging market
(Valdes 1996).
￿ Pure contagion eﬀects, deﬁned as indirect spillover eﬀe c t s ,i .e .t h e
simultaneous occurrence of crises which are not directly linked to
the common deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals. This
kind of pure contagion may be explained in two manners (Blejer
1998): either there are psychological factors that result in similar be-
haviour (unrelated to fundamentals) or a crisis in one country has
a trigger-eﬀect in a second country, by creating panic. The ﬁrst type
of eﬀects include the so called ‘wake-up call’ hypothesis (Goldstein
1998). It is said that Tailand acted as wake-up call for international
investors to reassess the creditworthiness of Asian borrowers and
when they did that reassessment, they found that a quite a few of
these economies had weaknesses similar to those in Tailand.
The evaluation of the East Asia crisis suggests that contagion eﬀects
played a role, even greater than in previous crises. Trade and ﬁnancial
ties and associated emerging market economies (eme) vulnerabilities
appear to help explain some of the spread of the crisis in Thailand to
other Asian emesi n1997/1998. In the more recent crisis in Argentina, a
lower incidence of emes with both strong links to Argentina and high
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associated vulnerabilities to shocks may go some way towards explaining
why the crisis has had a less marked impact elsewhere (Hall and Taylor
2002). If shifts in investor behaviour explain the limited spillovers from
Argentina, contagious crises may be less likely in the future.
lesson3: Increased Entwinedness Between Banking
and Balance-of-Payment Crises (bopCrises)
There was no apparent link between balance-of-payment crises and
banking crises during the 1970s, when ﬁnancial markets were highly
regulated. Liberalization of ﬁnancial markets in the 1980sb r o u g h tv e r y
close entwinedness between banking and currency crises. The crises in
Asia in 1997 highlighted this important link. Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) found some interesting lessons:
￿ Most often, the beginning of banking sector problems predates the
bopcrisis. A banking crisis increases the probability that a country
will fall prey to a currency crisis.
￿ Empiricalresultsalsosuggestthatthetwincrisesmayhavecommon
originsinthederegulationoftheﬁnancialsystemandthatthecredit
booms and asset bubbles appears to accompany these. Inadequate
regulation and lack of supervision at the time of the liberalization
may play a key role in explaining why deregulation and banking
crises are so closely entwined.
￿ Empirical tests found also evidence of a vicious cycle, in which the
currencycollapsefurtherundermines analreadyailingbankingsec-
tor. There maybealsoan adverserelation: ﬁnancial sector problems
undermine the currency. Devaluation, in turn, aggravates the exist-
ing banking sector problems and creates new ones. When currency
and banking crisesoccurjointly, they are farmore severe than when
they occur in isolation. In both types of crises, a ﬁnancial shock,
possibly ﬁnancial liberalization or increased access to international
capital markets, appears to activate a boom-bust cycle by providing
easy access to ﬁnancing.
Twin crises have been characterised by the following stylised facts:
sharp reversal of capital ﬂows, ﬁnancial liberalisation, ﬁnancial fragility,
market overreaction. The mechanism relies on two features that charac-
terised emerging markets which experienced twin crises:
￿ First, governments held ﬁxed exchange rate regimes or narrow ex-
change rate bands, which were vulnerable to speculative attacks.
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￿ Second, domestic banks had a mismatch between foreign liabilities
and domestic assets and were thus exposed to exchange rate risks.
Goldstein’s (2005) study shows, that an increase in the probability of
one type of crisis generates an increase in probability of the other type.
Both crises occur as a result of the complementarities between the bank-
ing sector and the currency market. Twin crises are expected to be more
frequent in ﬁnancially liberalised emerging markets and are expected
also to be more costly than regular banking and currency crises. Im-
portant implication: policy measures that do not aﬀect the reserves of
government, such as an international lender of last resort or suspension
of convertibility may be preferable for attacking twin crises.
lesson4: Crises are Becoming Unanticipated
Financial crises in Mexico in 1994–1995,A r g e n t i n ai n1995 and the ﬁve
East Asian economies 1997 display elements of self-fulﬁlling crises. The
evidence so far is that self-fulﬁlling attacks have become more likely in
a world of increased capital openness and mobility. Until the mid-1980s,
most countries enforced capital controls, therefore the self-fulﬁlling at-
tacks have played a minor role.
Many observers have noted the increasing intrinsic instability in in-
ternational lending: Radelet and Sachs (1998) concluded that emerging
markets are especially prone to self-fulﬁlling crises, since many emerging
markets lack the lender of last resort capacity to handle sudden shifts in
depositor conﬁdence. Premature ﬁnancial liberalization in such markets
creates self-fulﬁlling attacks. Emerging markets are handicapped twice:
￿ First, they aren’t suﬃciently equipped with a bulwark against panic,
since they usually don’t pasess a well-deﬁned and relatively trans-
parent system for managing bankruptcies, liquidations and other
forms of debt workouts.
￿ Second, international ﬁnancial markets feel the lack of bulwarks
against self-fulﬁlling panics, that are available in the domestic mar-
kets (deposit insurance, lender of last resort function, etc). With
globalization and premature ﬁnancial liberalization the emerging
economies are increasingly exposed to the instabilities of the inter-
national ﬁnancial markets.
The handicap of partial and incomplete liberalization has been man-
ifested in opening loopholes in other areas, which ﬁrms were quick to
exploit (Cole and Slade 1996). Asian events suggest an important lecture
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for emerging economies: if an economy suﬀers from distortions deriving
from implicit and explicit public guarantees that everybody would be
bailed-out if things went wrong, the liberalization of the capital market
will surely exacerbate these distortions. Government bail-out guarantees
will lead to serious moral hazard problems in the behaviour at banks:
they will be tempted to overland in the more risky investment projects.
The bail out promise derives from political distortions that lead govern-
ments to want to increase short-term growth and investment above their
socially optimal values (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1998).
The diﬃculties in predicting crises lead to the suggestion that special-
ists should be focused instead on the more modest goal of developing
early-warning indicators in order to prevent (and not predict) the recur-
rence of crises. In order to create a new set of early-warning indicators,
economists should focus on non-convencial deﬁciences, such as those
related to ﬁnancial fragility associated with ﬁnancial deregulation and
with capital inﬂows, to a declining eﬃciency of investment and to high
short-term external debt.
lesson5: Keep Current Account Deﬁcit Sustainable
Anumberofauthorsindicate thatbalanceof paymentcrisesaretypically
related to persistent current account deﬁcits. The East Asia crisis and
some studies (Frankel 1998) conﬁrm that close attention should be paid
to any current-account deﬁcit in excess of 4%o fgdp, particularly if it
is ﬁnanced in a way that could lead to rapid reversals. A current account
imbalance maybelesssustainableifitis derived from alargetrade deﬁcit
than from alargenegative netfactor income from abroad component. In
the case of Mexico (1994), a large and growing current account deﬁcit is
often singled out as a key determinant of the crisis. The Asian crises also
conﬁrm a clear connection between real appreciation, current account
deﬁcit and possible currency crashes.
Large deﬁcits lead to high external debt, to the point where the coun-
try either becomes insolvent (the present value of conceivable trade bal-
ance surpluses does not suﬃce to cover external obligations) or hits bor-
rowing constraint (lenders understand that the country will have no in-
centives to repay any additional debt). In the case of the Thailand cri-
sis, macroeconomic policy should have reigned in aggregate demand,
avoided excessive credit expansion and curtailed the excessive external
reliance on foreign savings. This would have reduced the extent of real
eﬀective overvaluation and the current account deﬁcit, and slowed the
buildupofshort-termexternal debtrelativetoforeignexchangerescives.
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The common factor observed in many crises is that economies had se-
rious macroeconomic imbalances, besides large and growing current ac-
count deﬁcit also ﬁscal deﬁcit, which led to excessive accumulation of
public debt or external debt that eventually become unsustainable. The
lesson is clear: avoid large current account deﬁcits ﬁnanced through
short-term, unhedged private capital inﬂows.
National measures, the aims of which are to improve the mechanism
for crisis prevention, management and resolution at the national level
should include these instruments:
￿ secure adequate foreign exchange reserves,
￿ maintain sound ﬁscal and monetary policy,
￿ adopt a viable exchange rate regime,
￿ establish orderly capital account liberalization,
￿ aggressively regulate and supervise ﬁnancial systems to ensure that
ﬁnancial institutions manage risks prudently.
Althoughstrongmacroeconomic fundamentals arenecessary,they are




cope with external shocks. Empirical studies (Stiglitz and Bhattacharya
1999), suggest polices that can achieve this ﬁnancial structure: pruden-
tial regulation of asset liability mismatches, and portfolio and loan stan-
dards that adhere to internationally accepted norms; capital adequacy
regulations that, at a minimum, match those which are required un-
der the Basle standards; clear governance rules to prevent insider and
group lending not subject to loan evaluation and creditworthiness and
standards; transparency for investors and depositors through mandatory
public disclosure of audited ﬁnancial statements; and, ﬁnally, deposit in-
surance limited to a minimal share of private liabilities to bound govern-
ment contingent liabilities in event of crisis, and share riskwith investors
and depositors. These policies should be supplemented on a global level
with policies that tighten regulations over ﬁnancial institutions that lend
to highly leveraged institutions.
Policy Implication
The generation approach towards ﬁnancial crises clearly shows evolu-
tion of economic policy considerations: the diﬀerences between ﬁrst and
second generation approach suggest that crises are no longer the result
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of obviously irresponsible economic policy and that crises may occur
suddenly in situations where no crises seemed inevitable. With the third
generation, crises are no longer mainly about monetary policy, so crises
become damaging for the economy.
Considering recent changes in the proﬁleration of third generation
models, we accept Krugman’s suggestion (2001) that a fourth generation
crisis model may not be a currency crisis model at all; it may be a more
general ﬁnancial crisismodelin whichother assetprices playthestarring
role.
In order to improve the policy response to ﬁnancial crises, three is-
sues must be considered: ﬁrst, the complexities involved in designing an
appropriate policy framework; second, the considerable trade-oﬀst h a t
policy makers face in formulating policy options; third, in the long run,
a country can remain exposed to signiﬁcant post-crises vulnerabilities.
Economic policy response is especially complicated by the need to assess
a variety of trade-oﬀs; ﬁscalconsolidation vis a vismedium-term growth
prospects; administrative measures for quelling a banking crisis vis-a-vis
risks of eroding conﬁdence in the banking system and triggering capital
ﬂight.
The appropriate policy framework is attributed to the government
to undertake the appropriate restrictive measures at the right time: the
low interest rate policies in Malaysia after the runs on the Thai baht are
a ﬁtting example of the unwillingness. The maintenance of restrictive
measures beyond an ‘emergence scenario’ can have destabilizing conse-
quences. Excessively tight ﬁscal discipline made the crisis-induced reces-
sion worse.
The Asian experience suggests that the economic policies with their
eﬀective rescue strategy must be bound to address the issues at the very
core of the crisis: strategies and measures have to diﬀerentiate between
structural problems and traditional macroeconomic imbalances. The
lessons we elaborate in our paper could signiﬁcantly reduce the fre-
quency and damage from capital ﬂow reversals and contagion.
It appears that policy makers have to focus on three distinct elements:
preventing crises, managing crises, and resolving the systemic conse-
quences of crises. In order to improve mechanisms for crises preven-
tion, management and resolution, Kawai et al. (2003) suggest measures
at the national, global and regional level. Financial globalization and
surge of capital ﬂows to emerging economies has made these economies
more vulnerable to shocks coming from the capital market itself. Calvo
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(2005) referred to these capital market shocks as ‘globalization hazard’
and found that traditional ﬁscal and monetary stabilization policies do
not seem very eﬀective and need to be complemented with structural
policies that help to lower domestic ﬁnancial vulnerability, especially in
economies suﬀering from a high incidence of foreign-exchange denom-
inated domestic bank loans.
Conclusions
The evidence reviewed in this paper conﬁrms that the growing vulner-
ability in emerging market economies can be attributed to the surge in
capital inﬂows and private investment. Financial crises of the 1990sh a v e
undoubtedly involved several interlinked phenomena, most of which
seem to be very important for the future development of the emerging
economies. Several aspects of the lessons are worth highlighting:
￿ The factors that underlie the emergence of imbalances of the ﬁnan-
cial sector could be seen as the combined consequence of domestic
ﬁnancial liberalization, external capital account liberalization, mas-
sive capital inﬂows and lack of prudential supervision and regula-
tion of the ﬁnancial system.
￿ If an economy initiates, but does not complete, the process of ﬁ-
nancial sector liberalization and reform, this fact would lead to
an increasingly fragile ﬁnancial system. Such a system is poten-
tially very vulnerable to rapid reversal of capital inﬂows. Emerg-
ing economies need properly functioning and well-regulated ﬁnan-
cial sectors. Banks and other ﬁnancial institutions need to be well-
structured and properly supervised.
￿ Current account imbalances have become larger since 1980 and
have led to building up a serious source of instability to the global
macroeconomy. National economy could be seriously damaged, if
thecurrentaccountdeﬁcit isﬁnanced with theaccumulationoffor-
eign debt in the form of short-term foreign-currency denominated
and unhedged liabilities. Asian events clearly suggest that current
account deﬁcit should be ﬁnanced largely by direct investment; in
this way, ﬁrst, a deﬁcit is more sustainable than a deﬁcit ﬁnanced by
short-term hot money (especially if it is coming from oﬃcial credi-
tors), and second, ﬁnancial ﬂows are less volatile and less reversible.
￿ Lessons from Asia, Russia and Argentina suggest that the power
of the early warning system is still weak. The problem with recent
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crises lies in the fact that an early warning system should indicate
vulnerability to crises well in advance and that a number of the in-
dicators tend not to signal vulnerability until a crisis is about to
occur.
￿ Emerging economies must be warned against the cases where ex-
ternal borrowing is heavily reliant on short-term, foreign currency-
denominated andunhedgedforeigndebt.Thepossibledepreciation
(exchangeratecrisis)wouldincreasetherealburdenofthedebtand
provoke a further ﬁnancial crisis.
￿ Emerging economies are by deﬁnition poorly institutionally devel-
oped. Therefore, what may start out as one type of crisis may de-
velop into others as well – foreign debt crisis, banking crisis, cur-
rency crises or even systemic ﬁnancial crises.
￿ A key feature of recent crises arises from ﬁnancial linkages between
countries. Globalization in the 1990s has turned out not to be the
cure but a cause of ﬁnancial crises. Changes in asset returns that are
due to shocks will contribute to changes in portfolio allocation to
all other emerging markets. Recent contagion episodes show that
the ﬁnancial crises in small economies have devastating eﬀects on
economies of very diﬀerent sizes and structures, with very few di-
rect trade or ﬁnancial links and in very severe and unexpected ways.
Recent events suggest that contagion is the likely reason for huge
and sudden withdrawal of capital.
￿ The ﬁnancial channel is, besides the trade channel, and similarity
channel another strong conduit spreading the contagion. With the
larger rise of mutual fund industry it is on a good way to becoming
the dominant channel.
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